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Strategic decision-makers (henceforth SDMs) typically operate in complicated and messy 
“large worlds” very different from the simple and sanitized “small worlds” of traditional decision 
theory (Savage, 1954) in which the decision-maker knows the full list of possible “acts”, “states” 
and “consequences” required to identify optimal solutions in accordance with the subjective 
expected utility (SEU) theory. In large worlds, in addition to risks that can be identified at the 
outset, SDMs may face extreme uncertainty in the form of unknowns and the potential Black Swans 
that may ensue from them (Feduzi & Runde, 2014). And where there are unknowns, state spaces 
are likely to be incomplete, classical probabilities are ruled out, and it is generally more difficult for 
SDMs to identify and select between appropriate courses of action.  
The problem of unknowns is especially acute where SDMs face ambiguous and non-
definitive information (Forbes, 2007; Gavetti & Rivkin, 2007). In the worst cases, trial and error 
(Cyert & March, 1963) or learning after the fact may be more effective than thinking in advance 
(Gavetti & Rivkin, 2005). Yet there remain strategic problems that do require thinking in advance 
and where boundedly rational SDMs may reasonably attempt to anticipate the broad consequences 
of broadly defined courses of action by constructing Small World Representations (SWRs) 
“approximating Savage’s (1954) notion of a perfect small world” (Maitland & Sammartino, 2015: 
1556, fn 1; Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000).  
However, where unknowns are rampant, the risk of committing prematurely to particular 
courses of action encourages a higher proportion of strategic decisions to be made during 
implementation. SDMs may wish to fine-tune their strategies as information accumulates, and to be 
in a position to contemplate courses of action not apparent at earlier points in time (Klingebiel & 
De Meyer, 2013). Strategic decision-making then becomes an ongoing, adaptive process in which 
 SWRs may be updated several times over the course of the implementation phase.  
While there is a large literature that addresses how SDMs (should) go about constructing 
SWRs (e.g., Maitland & Sammartino, 2015), there is little on the prescriptive question of how they 
should update their SWRs during the implementation phase under extreme uncertainty. We take a 
step towards addressing this question, drawing on work on reasoning in psychology. We focus on 
the problem that the lists of scenarios associated with particular SWRs tend to be highly incomplete 
in strategic decision processes, and investigate how two heuristic methods of inquiry—
disconfirmation and counterfactual reasoning—perform in the updating of SWRs in situations 
characterised by ambiguous and non-definitive information.  
 
SMALL WORLD REPRESENTATIONS, UNKNOWNS AND BLACK SWANS 
 
To capture the relationship between SWRs, unknowns and Black Swans, we draw on 
Faulkner, Feduzi and Runde (2017). Faulkner et al. define a known as “any feature of the world that 
an individual has knowledge of”, and an unknown (or gap in knowledge) as “any feature of the 
world that an individual lacks knowledge of” (2017: 1282), where a feature of the world is any fact 
“about past, present and future reality” (2017: 1281). They further distinguish between a known 
unknown—“a gap in knowledge that an individual knows about and is aware of at the relevant 
time”—and an unknown unknown—“a gap in knowledge that an individual is not aware of at that 
time, either because they do not know about that gap in knowledge or because, despite knowing of 
it, they are unaware of it” (2017: 1283). Finally, they introduce the concept of hypothetical values 
associated with a gap in knowledge, where a hypothetical value is “any value—outcome, state of 
affairs, result, quantity and so on—that could conceivably be thought to be a candidate for the 
actual or true value of the unknown under consideration” (2017: 1283).  
Consider a SDM in the process of constructing scenarios that might ensue from some 
strategic decision. The unknown in this case is how the future will unfold, and where the relevant 
hypothetical values are all of the scenarios that could conceivably be imagined with respect to that 
unknown. A scenario is a hypothetical future state of affairs flowing from a set of imagined 
influences, where an influence is any event or condition that could contribute causally to a state of 
affairs. Adapting Faulkner et al. (2017), all scenarios that could conceivably be imagined can be 
assigned to one of the cells in the table below. 
 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
 
Cells 1 and 2 contain scenarios imagined and regarded as possible by the SDM, split 
between those that are correctly (cell 1) and mistakenly (cell 2) regarded as such. Taken together, 
the scenarios in these two cells constitute the SDM’s subjective scenario space (henceforth SSS). 
The scenarios in cells 3 and 4 are those consciously imagined but excluded from the SSS because 
they are regarded as impossible, correctly so in cell 4 but mistakenly so in cell 3. The scenarios in 
cells 5 and 6 lie outside the SSS because they are not even imagined.  
We can now make the connection with the Black Swan popularised by Taleb (2007). One of 
Taleb’s (xvii–xviii) fundamental conditions for a Black Swan is that it is an event that is “an 
outlier, as it lies outside of the realm of regular expectations, because nothing in the past can 
convincingly point to its possibility.” A natural interpretation in light of this condition is that Black 
Swans arise where states of affairs occur ex post that did not figure in the SSS ex ante. Since a 
 Black Swan arises only once the relevant event occurs, it follows that the corresponding scenario 
would have had to be genuinely possible ex ante. We can thus disregard as candidate Black Swans 
the scenarios located in the right-hand column of Table 1. Black Swans arise only in respect of 
scenarios located in cells 3 and 5 and avoiding Black Swans then means minimizing the number of 
scenarios in cell 3 and bringing as many of the scenarios in cell 5 into cell 1. 
  
INSIGHTS FROM THE PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE ON REASONING 
 
Since scenarios are hypotheses generated and evaluated by boundedly rational decision-
makers, it is natural to ask what the psychology literature on hypothesis–testing behaviour 
(Poletiek, 2001) might tell us about how SDMs test or should test scenarios.  
A popular experimental task used to evaluate hypothesis-testing behaviour is Wason’s 
(1960) 2-4-6 discovery task. Here the experimenter decides a rule that generates particular triples of 
numbers, e.g., “three numbers in increasing order of magnitude”. Subjects are given a triple 
consistent with that rule (e.g., 2-4-6) and invited to uncover the rule. They do so by generating 
hypotheses about what the rule might be and testing these by providing triples of their own to the 
experimenter, who then tells them whether their triples conform to the rule. When subjects feel they 
have identified the rule, they are instructed to declare this. The task ends when a subject correctly 
identifies the rule or gives up. Wason found that the hypothesis-testing performance of his subjects 
was quite poor and attributed this to a bias towards using a confirmation heuristic of testing their 
hypothesized rules by generating triples consistent with those rules.  
Wason’s task and its variants went on to be used to study the efficacy of two heuristic 
methods of inquiry used in hypothesis-testing: disconfirmation and counterfactual reasoning. 
Disconfirmation recommends that the subject start with a working hypothesis, assume this 
hypothesis is correct, and then perform a series of tests that involve searching for new evidence 
inconsistent with the working hypothesis. If such evidence is found, the working hypothesis is 
eliminated, a new hypothesis generated, and the process begins again. The higher the number of 
tests passed by any working hypothesis, the greater the subject’s confidence in it. 
Counterfactual reasoning directs the subject to attempt to falsify any working hypothesis by 
searching for evidence in favor of alternative hypotheses. Here the subject again begins with a 
working hypothesis and performs a series of tests, but in this case on the assumption that the 
working hypothesis is false. The process involves generating an alternative to the working 
hypothesis that is consistent with the existing evidence, and then searching for new evidence that 
would be consistent with the alternative hypothesis and inconsistent with the original working 
hypothesis. If such evidence is found, the original working hypothesis is eliminated and the 
alternative becomes the new working hypothesis, and the process begins again. The higher the 
number of tests passed by any working hypothesis, the greater the subject’s confidence in it. 
Several studies have investigated whether disconfirmation improves performance in the 2-4-
6 task and found that its effectiveness depends on whether subjects are able to appeal to an external 
authority for feedback and on the nature of the rule (Gorman, 1995). Further, some studies 
(Tweney et al., 1980) have found that disconfirmation may be effective at later stages of the 
inferential process, after a confirmed hypothesis has been identified. But other studies argue that 
counterfactual reasoning is the key to improving subjects’ performance in the 2-4-6 task and its 
variants (Farris & Revlin, 1989a,b; Oaksford & Chater, 1994) because it induces subjects (1) to 
generate and test more than one hypothesis at a time, thereby forcing them to consider more 
hypotheses than they would otherwise, and (2) to perform negative tests because, when two 
competing hypotheses are tested simultaneously, the alternative hypothesis testing positive 
 corresponds to the working hypothesis testing negative (Evans, 2016).  
 
DISCONFIRMATION AND COUNTERFACTUAL REASONING  
 
SDMs are also in the hypothesis-testing business, also suffer from the confirmation bias, 
and also have the option of using disconfirmation or counterfactual reasoning to attenuate it. But 
situations of strategic decision-making differ from the laboratory in important ways. We focus on 
two of these differences. The first is that whereas the feedback in Wason-style tasks comes from an 
external authority and is unambiguous and reliable, strategic decision-making tends to involve 
ambiguity. The second is that while the information in Wason-style tasks typically allows 
hypotheses to be rejected rapidly and decisively, the information in strategic decision-making is 
seldom definitive in this sense.  
 
Offsetting The Confirmation Bias: The Ambiguity Effect 
 
While disconfirmation is effective in counteracting the confirmation bias in situations of 
low ambiguity, it is less so when ambiguity is high. The reason for this is that that newly acquired 
negative evidence may be false and therefore not to be acted on until more information comes in. 
This possibility leads to “hypothesis perseveration” (Gorman, 1989) in experiments in which 
subjects are instructed to use disconfirmation, but know that the feedback they receive has some 
probability of error. Results show that subjects tend either to immunize their hypotheses against 
disconfirmation by treating disconfirming results as errors, or to correctly recognize that there was 
no error but then devote so much time to replicating experiments that they fail to adequately falsify 
their hypotheses (Gorman, 1986, 1989). SDMs also face the challenge of the threat of false 
negatives providing grounds to resist giving up on existing scenarios immediately in the face of 
negative evidence. It follows that, the more ambiguous the information, the less inclined SDMs 
relying on disconfirmation will be to give up immediately on their existing scenarios, and the less 
effective disconfirmation will be in offsetting the confirmation bias. 
Ambiguity also reduces the extent to which counterfactual reasoning attenuates the 
confirmation bias, but the reduction is less damaging here. In contrast to disconfirmation, 
counterfactual reasoning is susceptible to false positives because it is aimed at including alterative 
scenarios on the basis of positive evidence. False positives are however less disruptive than false 
negatives because no matter how much evidence in favour of an alternative scenario is collected, it 
is never possible to verify it conclusively unless and until it occurs. And while false positives may 
lend alternative scenarios excessive credibility, this is welcome for encouraging SDMs to question 
the existing set of scenarios and take more seriously than they would otherwise the possibility of 
there being alternative scenarios. Of course, it may happen that false positives reduce the credibility 
of existing scenarios to the point of falsely disconfirming them. But in this case hypothesis 
perseveration works in a positive way by putting a brake on SDMs giving up on their existing 
scenarios immediately on including new ones. We thus arrive at: 
 
Proposition 1: In the face of ambiguity counterfactual reasoning helps SDMs offset 
the confirmation bias and thereby question their existing set of scenarios more 
effectively than does disconfirmation. 
 
Promoting The Exploration Of The Scenario Space 
 
 We now compare disconfirmation and counterfactual reasoning with respect to how 
ambiguity and non-definitive information affect the rate at which new scenarios are generated and 
the overall number of scenarios contemplated.  
Disconfirmation is fundamentally reactive method as it moves from the elimination of 
existing scenarios in the light of negative evidence to the generation of new influences and 
therefore new scenarios. The generation of new scenarios, and thus the exploration of the scenario 
space, emerges only as a by-product of updating beliefs in existing scenarios. However, since 
boundedly rational SDMs faced with ambiguous information tend to stick with their existing 
scenarios until they feel they can trust market signals, ambiguity reduces the speed at which new 
scenarios are generated and thereby the number of scenarios considered. 
In contrast, counterfactual reasoning is proactive as it moves from the generation of new 
influences (and therefore new scenarios) to attempting to find evidence relevant to them. The 
generation of new scenarios, and hence the exploration of the scenario space, thus becomes integral 
to the process of hypothesis testing. Moreover, as SDMs are explicitly directed to look only for 
positive evidence in favour of alternative possible scenarios, this requirement introduces a virtuous 
bias insofar as it encourages SDM to take them seriously. Ambiguity amplifies this effect by 
further increasing the credibility of alternative scenarios and therefore increasing the speed at 
which SDMs using counterfactual reasoning explore the scenario space and the number of 
scenarios that they consider. We thus arrive at: 
 
Proposition 2a: In the face of ambiguity, SDMs using counterfactual reasoning will 
contemplate more scenarios than those using disconfirmation.  
 
While the effects of ambiguity are often significant in the short run, they tend to diminish 
over time as the evidence mounts and uncertainties are resolved. SDMs will accordingly update 
their scenarios space anyway over time, whatever method of inquiry they adopt. However, the 
information in strategic contexts is rarely definitive, the rate at which scenarios are generated and 
evaluated depends on the method of inquiry used. 
SDMs using disconfirmation generate a new scenario only when new negative evidence is 
sufficient to eliminate an existing one. While this may sometimes occur, new evidence will often 
only throw doubt on a scenario, and it will take time to acquire sufficient disconfirming evidence 
for that scenario to be eliminated. This is all the more so the more confident SDMs are that a 
specific scenario provides a good guide to action. Of course it is possible that negative evidence 
might build sufficiently to justify the elimination of an existing scenario, and where the SDM is 
then prompted to explore the scenario space and come up with an alternative scenario. The speed of 
such exploration, and accordingly the overall number of scenarios contemplated, is however 
significantlyand negativelyaffected by the non-definitive nature of the available evidence.   
The non-definitiveness of information also affects SDMs using counterfactual reasoning as 
the acquisition of new (positive) evidence leads to only gradual increases in the credibility of new 
scenarios and corresponding decreases in the credibility of existing ones. However, since 
counterfactual reasoning does not require an existing scenario to be eliminated for a new one to be 
generated, the non-definitive nature of the information does not impact on the rate at which SDMs 
explore the scenario space. The set of scenarios will grow until the credibility of any existing 
scenario is driven low enough for it to be eliminated. But this is not a problem, as the goal here is 
exactly that of exploring the scenario space rather than merely updating it, and of increasing the 
overall number of scenarios contemplated. We thus arrive at:  
 
 Proposition 2b: In the face of non-definitive information, SDMs using counterfactual 
reasoning will contemplate more scenarios than those using disconfirmation. 
 
Coping With Black Swans: Taking Action  
 
Finally, we compare disconfirmation and counterfactual reasoning in terms of how well 
they allow SDMs to mitigate or exploit what would otherwise have been Black Swans.  
Disconfirmation invites SDMs to generate new scenarios only when an existing scenario is 
eliminated in the light of new negative evidence. This limits the extent to which disconfirmation 
promotes the uncovering of potential Black Swans and being able to respond in a timeous way. In 
addition, looking only for evidence inconsistent with the existing scenarios might divert attention 
from alternative influences and scenarios that might usefully be generated. Finally, even if 
disconfirmation happens to be sufficiently effective to rule out all scenarios that had been 
contemplated up to that point, SDMs will be left without any hypothesis about where the future is 
heading, reducing their capacity to anticipate what would then be Black Swans for them.  
In contrast, by encouraging the constant generation of alternative scenarios, counterfactual 
reasoning leads to a larger number of scenarios being tested at any stage, thereby promoting the 
uncovering of a larger number of potential Black Swans. If sufficient evidence in favor of a new 
scenario can be found, this opens the way to identifying and implementing completely new courses 
of action. Moreover, when new evidence indicates that all existing scenarios should be disregarded, 
SDMs are never left without a hypothesis to fall back on. This leads to:   
 
Proposition 3: In the face of ambiguous and non-definitive information, counterfactual 
reasoning is superior to disconfirmation in helping SDMs take actions to mitigate or 




In highly uncertain situations, counterfactual reasoning is more effective than 
disconfirmation with respect to (1) counteracting the confirmation bias, (2) promoting the 
exploration of the scenario space, and (3) facilitating the adoption of actions to mitigate or exploit 
what would otherwise have been Black Swans. 
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TABLE 1 
Classifying The Scenarios Associated With A Strategic Decision 
    Scenario is … 
    a genuine possibility 









1. Scenarios imagined 
and correctly regarded 
as possible 
2. Scenarios imagined 
and incorrectly 




3. Scenarios imagined 
and incorrectly 
regarded as impossible 
4. Scenarios imagined 
and correctly regarded 
as impossible 
 not consciously 
imagined  
 
5. Scenarios not 
imagined 
6. Scenarios not 
imagined 
 
